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In the Supreme Court of the
State of Utah

FAIRFIELD IRRIGATION COMPANY, )
Plaintiff and Respondent,

vs.

\

ERNEST CARSON and MRS. ERNEST )(
CARSON, his wife,
Defendants and Appellants.

CASE
NO. 7670

Petition For Rehearing and Brief In

Support Thereof

Comes now respondent and respectfully petitions the
Court for a rehearing herein on the grounds that the court
erred:
1. In holding that the statutes in effect prior to 1935
required anyone to make a statutory filing on the waters in
question in order to appropriate the same, and
2. In holding that respondent was not misled by the
change in concept as to public waters.
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ARGUMENT
1. STATUTES PRIOR TO 1935 DID NOT REQUIRE
A FILING ON UNDERGROUND WATER FROM ANYONE.

The court has here held that the waters in question had
been abandoned and had reverted to the public by 1912that they were by 1912 public waters subject to appropriation (page 4). The court then held that the statutes in
effect from 1903 to 1935 required a filing by respondent,
because respondent did not come within "the exception of
the Hansen case."
It is respectfully submitted that the court has overlooked the fact that the statutes at all times prior to 1935
did not purport to give the State Engineer jurisdiction over
underground water. Without a single exception every application filed from 1903 until after 1935 on artesian water
and percolating water has been rejected. It was because
of the fact that the State Engineer did not have jurisdiction over such waters that Mr. Justice Folland in Wrathall
v. Johnson, 86 Utah 50, 40 P. (2d) 755, made his judicial.
recommendation (page 158 Utah Reports) that the Legislature bring water from artesian basins under the control
of the State Engineer. As was noted by Mr. Justice Folland
in the Wra thall case:
"In no legislative act, from the beginning down to
the present, are subterranean waters expressly mentioned, except in the later enactments wher~ water in
tmderground streams flowing in known or defined channels are declared to be the property of the public . . . .
Whether underground percolating waters be regarded
as public or not the one thing needed at this time to
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effect a conservation of this natural resource is legislation extending a more definite control by the state'
engineer or other public authority . . . ."
Following that recommendation the statutes were
amended in 1935 to extend the State Engineer's jurisdiction
for the first time to underground water.
The 1935 statute did not change the waters which were
publicly owned. It could not have done so. It would have
violated constitutional due process to proceed by legislative
fiat to transfer private water to public water. This ·Court
so stated in the Riordan case. Because of this, the c·ourt
said in the Riordan case that underground waters had always been public waters. All the 1935 amendment did was
to follow the recommendation of Mr. Justice Folland and·
extend the jurisdiction and control of the State Engineer to
this class of water.
To hold that the 1903 statute requiring a filing on
ground water, as the court has done in the instant case,
is to ascribe to the Legislature the doing of a useless act in
1935. If the statutes prior to 1935 already required a filing on underground water as the cou.rt has here held, there
was no need for the 1935 amendment. The Hansen case
would then be simply a judicial exception to the statutory
requirement, so that a land owner would not be penalized
by not having filed. We submit that the 1935 amendment
was not the doing of a useles~ act, that Mr. Justiec Folland
\Vas correct when he said that no legislative act had applied_
to underground water, and that his recommendation that
the State Engineer be given control of ground water was
sound.
In short, all waters have always been publicly owned.
Riordan v. Westwood, 203 P. 922. But only water in known
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or defined channels was placed under the jurisdiction of
the State Engineer in 1903. The balance of these public
waters (both on public and private lands) could still be appropriated by useage. In 1934 Mr. Justice Folland recommended that the Legislature extend the State Engineer's
control to this class of water also. This was done by the
1935 amendment. Until the 1935 amendment no application to appropriate artesian waters could have been legally
filed, because the State Engineer had no jurisdiction over
that class of water.
The State E'ngineer is an administrative officer of limited, as distinguished from general, jurisdiction. He has
only the powers granted to him by statute. Tanner v Beer,
49 Utah 536, 165 P. 465. By the statute in 1903 he was
granted. jurisdiction over streams and other sources of wa"!
ter ''in known or defined channels.'' He could not extend
his jurisdiction to any other class of water, even though
such waters were public waters.
The court has held against us because we did not make
a statutory filing prior to 1933. We assert that none could
have been made. These were wells. Like the waters in the
cases cited below, these wells were never under the State
Engineer's jurisdiction until the 1935 .amendment. Like in.
the cases cited below, a filing, if ·made, would have and
sh~uld have been rejected.
'

-

The statutes prior to 1935 dealing with this subject
came into the law in 1903. Se~ Sec. 47, Chap. 100, Laws
of Utah, 1903. There public water was defined to exclude
all underground water except that flowing in "known or defined channels.'' Only water in such defined channels was
under the jurisdiction and control of the State Engineer.
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Waters not in kno\v nor defined channels were not within
his jurisdiction. The cases are uniform-no filing on any
class of water other than· water in known or defined channels could have been accepted. Section 100-3-1 requiring
a filing (also in effect in 1903) applied- only to waters which
had been defined by Section 100-1-1. All other water (wells,
drains, tunnels, etc.) could not be filed on.
This very problem was considered ~by the court in
Wrathall v. Johnson, supra, Mr. Justice Folland at page 157
explained the concept which we have set forth above in the
following words: ·
"While the statute (Section 100-1-1, Revised Stat(~
utes 1933) is not entirely free from ambiguity, it would
seem to exclude percolating waters from the waters
declared to be the property of the public. Section 2780
of Comp. Laws Utah 1888, which recognizes the right
to the use of water 'whenever any person or persons
shall have taken, diverted and used any of the unappropriated water of any natural stream, water course,
lake, or spring, or other natural source of supply,' were
intended to include percolating waters. These words
have been construed and have been made applicable to
percolating waters only when the appropr~ation was
made while the lands on which or in which such waters
were found were still part of the public domain, and
by the cases heretofore referred to restricted to such
meaning."
Mr. Justice Folland went on to state that in no legislative act from the beginning down to the present are subterranean waters expressly mentioned, and then went on
with his recommendation that the Legislature bring underground waters unde~ the jurisdiction of the State Engineer.
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2. THE CASES PRIO·R TO THE' RIORDAN CASE
UNIF\ORMLY HELD THAT THIS WATER COULD NOT
HAVE BEEN FILED OIN BY RE'SPONDENT.

Until the Riordan case, there is not one case in all of
the Utah Reports where a filing on developed water had
been accepted by the State Engineer or upheld by the Court.
We are therefore at a loss to understand why the court
would hold that the respondent and its predecessors were
not misled by a change in ·concept and that they could have
and should have made a filing in 1912 when these waters
reverted to the public. We respectfully submit that a filing made on these waters at that time would have and
should have been rejected. There are numerous cases from
this c·ourt involving waters of this class under circumstances similar to those of the instant case, in which a statutory filing was attempted and in which the State Engineer
and the court both held that the filing was improper. We
believe that the cases, insofar as a filing is concerned were
correct under the statutes as they existed at that time. The
cases to follow demonstrate forcefully the utter futility of
making a filing at any time prior to 1935.
Immediately before 1903, a statute covering appropriation generally and using language equally as broad as that
. used in 1903 was held to have no application to water having
its origin in percolationk from private lands. In view of this
helding in 1900, the Legislature certainly would have been
more explicit had it intended the 1903 amendment to extend
to such waters. The case is Willow Creek v. Michaelsen,
21 Utah 248. The 1903 statute applied to waters in "known
or defined channels." The statute existing in 1900 provided
that waters of a ''natural stream, water course, lake, spring
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or other natural source of supply" were subject to appropriation. Certainly, waters from wells were a natural source
of supply, as that term is usually used, and so were pe,rcolating \Vaters. This Court said, however, that this statute
did not apply to "springs, or streams or other water arising
through percolation on private land." In that case a stream
actually flowed from the lands in question. The stream was
a natural stream, not developed by the activities of man.
But it did not appear until after the land had passed to private ownership. The Court said that it could not be appropriated and that the statute did not apply.
Two years earlier in Crescent Mining Company v. Silver King Mining Co., 17 Utah 444, the Silver King Mine had
developed a flow of water by digging a mining tunnel. The
tunnel was dug prior to 1883 and the waters ran from the
tunnel and commingled with the waters of a natural lake
or pond as was the case here. The Crescent Mining Co.
made a diligence appropriation of the water from the lake
and fully complied with the law regarding appropriation
as it then existed. The waters flowing from the tunnel were
thus used by Crescent for more than seven years and Crescent claimed that by complying fully with the laws of 1880
regarding appropriation it had appropriated the tunnel water. The Supreme Court held to the contrary and said that
water from the tunnel was percolating water and that it
was owned by Silver King and was not subject to appropriation.
The case of Peterson v. Eureka Hill Mining Company,
53 Utah 70, 176 P. 729, involved a dispute which arose in
1912. This 1912 date is important, because it is the date
that the court in the instant case says the waters here involved had reverted to the public. In the Peterson case,
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Peterson made an application to appropriate, just as the
court said we should have done here. The waters there,
as here, were developed waters-coming from a mining tunnel. Prior to the excavation of the tunnel there was a small
seep which flowed some 150 feet, but it did not leave the
land. Then a substantial flow was developed hy the tunnel,
and the tunnel water did flow from the land. In the instant
case, water was developed by wells which did flow from the
land. In that case, the Court said that even if it were assumed that the ·digger of the tunnel had not properly acquired the right to use the water in question as an appropriator, still a filing could not prevail, because the water was
hot open to filing. The Court said at page 76:
"When his application to appropriate the water
from lsaid spring was made the land upon which the
spring is located had ceased to be public domain for a
period of more than eight years, and the title thereto
during all of said time was vested in the defendant.
Under such circumstances the plaintiff could not, over
the protest of the defendant, acquire any right to the
water in said spring at the time he made application
therefor in the State Engineer's office, (citing Kinney
on Irrigation). It is clear, therefore, that quite apart
from defendant's claim respecting its appropriation and
use of the waters from the spring during the many
years before stated, plaintiff's. claim to said water, according· to his own statements, can not prevail, since
it dates only from September 1912, at which time the
title to the land on which the spring is located had long
since passed into private ownership."
Thus, both immediately before the 1903 statute and
in 1912 when the waters here involved reverted to the public, this Court held that waters developed on private lands
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were not under the jurisdiction of the State Engineer and
that a filing thereon by a person in the position of respondent in this case could not prevail.
Next came Deseret Livestock v. Hooppiania, 66 Utah
25, 239 P. 479. The same distinction was made in that case,
again demonstrating that even had the respondent made a
filing ·in this case, the filing would have been rejected both
by the Court and the State Engineer. In the Deseret Livestock case, twelve springs were involved. Several· of the
springs yielded a sufficient flow to form a defined channel.
The remainder did not. Deseret made a statutory filing· on
all of the waters, i. e., those which formed a channel and
those which did not. Hlooppiania had been using both classes.of water prior to the filing. As to the water in defined
channels, the Court held that the filing with the State Engineer prevailed and that a filing was indispensable to initiate a right. As to the waters which did not form a channel
the Court held that the filing was ineffectual. P, other
words, the State Engineer was compelled to refuse to take
jurisdiction over percolating waters.
The same question was pointed up in Holman v. Christensen, 73 Utah 389, 274 P. 457·. There again a seep had
been developed into a substantial flow by artificial means.
The waters were collected in man-made drains and then
flowed in substantial quantities fro~ the land of the appropriator. In this regard the case is again directly in point
with the instant case. In both cases man-made developments were present. In the instant case the evidence clearly
indicates that without the man-made development the water would not have flowed to the surface and into the Fairfield Springs. In the I-Iolman case, the Court noted that
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the evidence was not sufficient to deter1nine whether the
water from the seep would have reached the surface and
flowed from the land, 'but it expressly said that it did not
hold taht water which was caused to run from the land by
ot~r than natural means was subject to appropriation. The
Court went on to note that the drains had increased the
flow 100 per cent and that ''in no event is the defendant entitled to more than one-half of.the water which flows from
the plaintiffs' drain." The Court remanded the case for a
determination of the quantity of the water available prior
to the digging of the drains, but said that since it appeared
that the water in controversy arose on the plaintiffs' lands
and that the plaintiffs had for some years been in control
of the water, the burden was cast upon the defendant to
show the nature and extent of his prior use.
Then came Mr. Justice Folland's discussion in the
Wrathall case, supra, Beginning at page 149, all of the
cases which we have cited above are noted .and essentially
the quotes set forth above were given. After analyzing
these cases, he stated:
''The cases thus far discussed establish, I think,
the rule that the owner of the soil is the owner of waters '·percolating in or through his lands and that such
waters are not subject to appropriation by any one
except the owner, and do not disclose that such owner
is obliged to comply with the law of the state with respect to ·making his appropriation in the manner by
law required; that is, he may put his waters to a beneficial use on the lands where found, or elsewhere where
others' rights are not impaired, not by reason of the
law of prior appropriation, but because of his ownership of the freehold in which· such waters are percolating."
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Thus right up until 1934 this Court was announcing to
the people that statutes governing the law of appropriation
did not apply at all to underground or developed water, and
that such water could be put to use without complying with
the statutory requirements. The statutes as they had existed from 1903 simply were not construed as applying to this
class of water. Developed ·waters had been the frequent
subject of litigation. They were frequently filed up~n, but
as demonstrated above, every single filing was rejected, and
they should have been, because the State Engineer did not
have jurisdiction over such waters. The Court, because of
an erroneous legal concept, had been treating the waters as
private waters. But the Court recognized in the Wrathall
case that it might have been in error in holding these waters to be private waters. It nevertheless recognized that
even though the waters were public waters, they had not/
theretofore been brought under the requirement of a statutory filing. This led Justice Folland to make his recommendation which resulted in amendments in 1935 to extend
the control of the State Engineer to this class· of water.
Then and only then was it necessary to make a statutory
filing on developed water. Certainly, respondent and
its
-.
predecessors were as much misled as the· owner of the land
as to the no\v announced necessity for making a statutory
filing.
'

'

The Hansen v. Salt Lake City case was, we believe,
correctly decided, but we submit that it did not make a judicial exception from the statute. It merely correctly noted
that the statutes prior to 1935 did not apply to undergroun9
water.
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SUMMARY

This holding does not involve merely the narrow fact
situation presented here. There are many cases in the state
where appropriations have been made by diligence from
lands not owned by the appropriator. If this holding prevails, no individual who is using water from underground
sources has a good water right if he initiated his use after
1903 on land not owned· by him. He is subject to having
the water taken from him at any time by a filing. The decision will place in the law of appropriation of underground
water a hopeless confusion. Appropriation of underground
water from the public domain by useage was so well known
and so common a practice that there are numerous rights
which had such an origin after 1903. Such waters were
subject to appropriation even prior to 1903. Sullivan v.
Northern Spy, 11 Utah 48. But a filing was never permitted until 1935. The uniform administrative practice of the
State Engineer prior to 1935 was to reject a filing from anyone (the land owner or the stranger) on developed water.
The State Engineer correctly held that he had no jurisdiction over such waters. To now leave the question of appropriation of underground water under the nebulous concept that the land owner was misled so that he did not need
to file, but that other persons were not misled so that they
must have. filed, finds no basis in the statutes and destroys
the solid work done by this Court in the Riordan and Hansen cases. Those cases had squarely developed the principle that underground water always was public water, and
that the law must now be applied as though that concept
had always been recognized. They also established that
after 1935 a filing on ground water was necessary, put that
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prior to 1935 a filing \vas not necessary. They had thus
given to the appropriator of developed water a definite date
as to when filings became necessary. It took the ·Court
nearly 20 years to develop the same principle for surface
water. Beginning with the Deseret Livestock case, the holding was that filings were indispensable to a surface appropriation after 1903, but not before. The doctrine was challenged in the Wmthall case, but was definitely laid at rest
in the Wellsville ·case, (104 Utah 448). Thus the law had
followed the statutes and become definite and easy of administration. On surface water, useage alone was all right
until1903, but after 1903 the statute required a filing. On
ground water useage alone was all right until1935, but after
1935 a filing was necessary, because the statute was amended pursuant to a judicial recommendation to place that
water under the control of the State Engineer.
The court now says that we must lose this water which
we used ~ontinuously for 29 years after 1905, because we
did not file. The prior cases make it unmistakably clear
that had we filed, it would have been rejected. Such a holding would have been correct, because the State Engineer
did not until 1935 have jurisdiction over such waters. The
court now says that because we wer_e not misled into not
filing, we cannot take the advantage of the holding in the
ffansen case, thus in effect stating that the statutes required
us to file, but that the Hansen case made an exception for
the land owner. This denies us the equal protection of the
law. Our rehearing is predicated upon our assertion that
no statute required a filing on developed water prior to 1935
and that had we filed it would properly have been rejected.
It is predicated also on the assertion that if the Hansen case
did make an exception, it should be extended to us, because
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of the fact every person who n1ade a filing on developed water prior to 1935 had his filing rejected by the Court.
We, therefore, earnestly request the Court to grant a
rehearing on this matter, and request it to re-examine the
. statutes and the cases.
Respectfully submitted,
EDWARD W. CLYDE
GEORGE S. BALLIF
Attorneys for Respondent

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

